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INTRODUCTION
Flipping through the morning’s correspondence deposited
in his in-box, Tom Esquire shuffles past envelopes containing
plane tickets to a client meeting in New York, an invitation to
speak at a conference in Washington, and a chipper notice
announcing his twenty-five year high school reunion. Arriving
at a gusset-sized envelope from a nearby venture capital firm,
Tom stops his shuffling. He slices through the creased flap
with his Waterford crystal letter opener and pulls forth the
draft offering statement for his new client, Cashout-Dot-Com.
Thumbing through the first few pages of the statement, Tom
smiles at how the success of this new client will provide him
with a proportional windfall. Tom’s compensation package for
his work on the deal includes eight percent of the stock that he
arranged to issue to the incorporators of the company.
Cashout-Dot-Com received its Angel financing and substantial
venture financing in its first venture capital round. The
venture capitalists are eager to take the company public. The
market for IPO issues seems strong, and the public offering is
set at 100 million dollars with the closing to occur in two
weeks. Tom is overwhelmed with pride in helping to facilitate
this potential success, and even more overwhelmed at the
prospect of finally breaking free of the shackles of his personal
line of credit, so frequently strained since the spring that his
daughter was accepted at Stanford.
Just then, Tom receives a telephone call from Washington.
Cashout-Dot-Com’s principal patent application has just been
made the subject of an interference proceeding with a patent
application filed by a competitor dot com company.
Furthermore, the Patent Office has named Cashout-Dot-Com’s
inventor as the junior party. As a junior party, Tom’s client
will have the burden of proof to show that his company
invented first. Tom looks more intently at the draft offering
statement on his desk. The draft statement includes a section
on patent filings, but nothing about the interference.
“Investors will want to know about this,” Tom thinks to
himself. Then the phone rings again. It’s Victor Ventura,
senior partner in the venture capital firm. Tom tells him about
the pending interference.
Victor exclaims, “We don’t have to put that in there
because you’re going to win that one for us, aren’t you Tom?”
Tom explains, “As junior party, this is a tough hill to
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climb.”
Victor’s response is immediate and authoritative: “If we
put THAT in the statement, this deal may not go. We’ve got to
have an opinion letter from a top-drawer firm like yours that
we will win the interference.”
The phone call ends. Tom slumps in his chair. If he writes
a strong opinion letter, the client will think that his firm will
win the interference. If he hedges too much, the deal might not
go. He doesn’t even have enough time before the closing to
interview all the principal individuals, analyze the competitor’s
legal and factual position, and determine the strength of the
evidence and the law supporting Cashout-Dot-Com’s date of
invention. Tom now realizes that his opinion letter is going to
be a second-class piece of work. He wishes that he could just
pick up the phone, call Victor and say, “No, we’re not going to
give an opinion like that.”
The phone rings again. It’s Cashout-Dot-Com’s founder.
He says, “Tom, I just talked with Mr. Ventura. He said that
this market may have only a short window for doing this IPO,
and that you are working on getting the disclosure issues
resolved in time. I’m glad we have you to solve these
problems.”
Tom’s throat suddenly feels very dry. He can hardly choke
out a soft “thank you,” before hanging up. Tom now realizes his
problem. If he had this work on an hourly basis, he would have
told Victor “no way!” without much hesitation ten minutes ago.
After all, he has walked away from other client schemes in the
past even though the lost fees could have amounted to twentyfive, fifty, or even a hundred thousand dollars. But this one
was much harder. In two weeks he would go from a barely
positive net worth to never having to work again. He would
COUNT. He would be one of the PLAYERS, not just a
spectator in the game. He could be worth five to eight million
at the moment of issuance, and maybe worth twenty million at
the end of the first day’s run-up.
Tom knows what is wrong. He has lost his independence.
He can no longer provide effective legal advice. He’s not
practicing a profession now. He’s just trying to make money.
This scene illustrates the tremendous pressures that may
unduly influence a lawyer’s decisions. The rules of ethics that
guide lawyers help define what the public should be able to
expect from lawyers they retain.
The above scenario
demonstrates how a lawyer becomes distracted from these
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rules by the very real and powerful influences of an
entrepreneurial culture. This article explores several specific
dangers that arise in this culture when a lawyer is expected to
provide impartial professional advice, either from a position
inside or outside of the enterprise.
I.

PITFALLS IN TAKING EQUITY AS A FORM OF
PAYMENT

Scenario: NewCo is preparing to go public. NewCo has
minimal capital, negligible sales, no contracts, but is on the
verge of acquiring $100 million via investors eager to add a
high-risk technology start-up to their portfolio. NewCo has
retained Counsel to facilitate its initial public offering.
Without funds to pay cash for its legal fee, NewCo has offered
Counsel a five percent equity share in NewCo. Counsel eagerly
accepts the shares in exchange for traditional hourly billing.
NewCo is two weeks away from going public, and Counsel is
1
two weeks away from becoming a millionaire. The challenge
for Counsel is to provide independent, unbiased advice and
avoid the temptation to simply rush ahead toward the riches
that will certainly follow the IPO.
Historically, lawyers have participated with clients in
making investments and in taking ownership interests in small
2
businesses. Under the current legal climate, however, the

1. The prospects of earning millions of dollars overnight is an exciting
reality for some firms that have invested in their clients. The top five first-day
IPO gains in 1999 for law firms that have invested in clients taking their stock
public are as follows: Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati’s (“Wilson Sonsini”)
2,068,944 shares of Webvan were valued at $51,475,327 at the end of the first
day of the stock trading; Wilson Sonsini’s 102,584 shares of VA Linux were
valued at $24,543,222 at the end of the first day of the stock trading; Wilson
Sonsini’s 273,773 shares of Ask Jeeves were valued at $17,778,819 at the end
of the first day of the stock trading; Hughes & Luce’s 402,552 shares of Perot
Systems were valued at $17,728,512 at the end of the first day of the stock
trading; and Brandes Naschitz & Co.’s 863,997 shares of Backweb
Technologies were valued at $17,012,101 at the end of the first day of the stock
trading. See Debra Baker, Who Wants to be a Millionaire?, 86 A.B.A. J. 36
(February 2000).
2. See, e.g., Grievance Committee of the Fairfield County Bar v. Leo
Nevas, 96 A.2d 802 (Conn. 1953), where the defendant helped the complainant
set up a corporation in which defendant took control of 40 percent of the issued
stock. Id. at 803-04. The trial court found that defendant was not guilty of
unprofessional conduct, and the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed this
decision under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. at 805-06. The
trial court specifically noted that defendant “had concealed no material fact
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scenario where a lawyer accepts equity in a client as a means of
payment (as described above) is fraught with ethical pitfalls.
This type of transaction may expose a lawyer to malpractice
liability and sanctions from an ethics board, in addition to
3
invalidation of the transaction. Having an equity stake in a
client can compromise a lawyer’s independent judgment and
4
strain a longstanding rapport with that client. Further, only a
small portion of the big-name technology IPOs ever turn out to
5
be profitable. Thus, it may be both unethical and highly risky
to tread the path of a client equity holder. Although it may be
6
possible to create an equity relationship with a client, the
following section discusses the major potential pitfalls, many of
which have been addressed in the recently-issued Formal
Opinion 418 of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
7
Responsibility (“Opinion 418”).

from the complainant.” Id. at 805. Despite finding the defendant innocent of
unprofessional conduct, the trial court stated that:
I feel that Mr. Nevas, the respondent, deserves criticism for becoming
involved personally and financially in his client’s business. There was a
complete absence of prudence and good taste. His involvement apparently
became inextricable after he had put in the first $5,000. From then on
everything he did sought to save the money he had improvidently already
paid in. He should not have done that.

Id. The appellate court noted that, although the trial court found respondent
innocent, it “might well have decided that a public reprimand should be
administered to the defendant.” Id. at 806.
3. See infra Parts I.A-C.
4. See id.
5. See BAKER, supra note 1, at 38-39 (“With all the attention paid to the
monster gains in the Internet IPO market, few people are paying attention to
the losers. . . . Despite the jackpots that many investors make, observers
estimate that in the high-stakes game of technology, losers outnumber the
winners by as much as 20 to 1. And that doesn’t take into account the
companies that make it to the public market but fail a few months down the
road.”).
6. Indeed, some commentators encourage these types of transactions.
See, e.g., Jason M. Klein, No Fool for a Client: The Finance and Incentives
Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate Lawyers, 2 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 330 (1999) (“Allowing compensation of lawyers with client stock or
options should be encouraged not only because it is market-driven, but also
because it adds value to the client, the economy, and society.”); Gwyneth E.
McAlpine, Note, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Lawyers Be Allowed to
Invest in Their Clients’ Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 549, 596 (1999) (“Because of
the benefit to the client, the transactions should not be discouraged by
ineffectual procedural requirements.”).
7. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
418 (2000), reprinted in the Appendix.
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MATERIAL LIMITATIONS BY A LAWYER’S OWN INTERESTS

A lawyer who acquires stock in a client in lieu of a cash
payment must ensure that his actions are in accord with Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7(b). Rule 1.7(b) prohibits
a lawyer from representing a client if the representation “may
8
be materially limited . . . by the lawyer’s own interests.” If the
representation may be materially limited, the lawyer must
decline representation or else satisfy two additional
requirements: the lawyer must reasonably believe that “the
representation will not be adversely affected,” and the client
9
must consent to the representation after consultation.
The ABA Committee’s Opinion 418 offers a hypothetical
10
that is very similar to the NewCo and Counsel scenario.
Opinion 418 describes a situation in which an attorney’s
ownership of stock in a corporation may conflict with the
11
For example,
attorney’s responsibilities to the corporation.
when the attorney is rendering an opinion on behalf of the
corporation to potential investors, the attorney may have a
duty to advise the corporation to reveal material adverse
information, even though the revelation may cause the
12
potential investor to withdraw. Opinion 418 instructs that in
this scenario, when the attorney’s financial interest runs
counter to the duty to provide independent, unbiased advice,
the attorney must “subordinat[e] any economic incentive” that
13
may result from owning equity in the corporation. Then the
attorney must evaluate his “ability to maintain the requisite
14
professional independence.”

8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (2000). Rule
1.7(b) states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a
third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2)
the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
See Formal Op. 418.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Formal Op. 418.
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Drawing out the hypothetical even further, Opinion 418
posits a scenario in which the attorney’s stock in the
corporation is also the attorney’s major asset, and a failure to
obtain outside investors would result in a significant financial
15
loss to the attorney. Opinion 418 warns that the attorney’s
self-interest likely justifies a reasonable belief that his
16
representation may not be independent and unbiased.
Opinion 418 provides clear advice in this scenario: “This [selfinterest] would disqualify [the attorney] under Rule 1.7(b) from
17
providing the opinion even were the client to consent.” Thus,
not even the consent of a client, after a disclosure of all the
potential conflicts of interest, would permit an attorney to
18
continue representation in that situation.
If NewCo’s IPO closes as expected, Counsel stands to
receive $5 million, which is analogous to the scenario
considered in Opinion 418. This potential immediate payoff for
Counsel provides a powerful incentive for him to compromise
his independent, unbiased advice in light of the great benefit
that completion of the transaction will realize for him. With
two weeks separating Counsel from a payday large enough for
him to retire from practice, even an attorney guided by a strong
ethical compass, with a copy of the Model Rules in hand, would
find it difficult to instruct a client that it must make a material,
adverse disclosure or that it would be best to hold off on the
IPO until certain issues can be resolved – especially given the
nebulous nature of the standards of prudence in this area of
law.
But what if this particular conflict never materializes?
What if preparation for the IPO proceeds as planned and
Counsel is never faced with the decision of having to advise
NewCo to disclose or postpone? Is Counsel permitted to
maintain the significant equity share and continue to represent
NewCo? The formal opinion is clear on this point: if the
attorney’s self-interest justifies a reasonable belief that his
representation may not be independent and unbiased, then
19
under Rule 1.7(b) the attorney must decline representation. If
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id. Model Rule 1.7(b) permits an attorney to continue representation
only if “the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected.” MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (2000). One
learned treatise notes that Model Rule 1.7(b) “applies whenever
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Counsel in this instance must decline representation where no
actual conflict materializes, then, a fortiori, in a situation
where Counsel finds himself revisiting his advice to the client
based on his own personal interest, and realizes that his
potential financial gains are skewing the disinterest of his
advice, the representation most certainly must be declined.
The pitfalls of stock ownership are not unique to outside
counsel. As an example, if the NewCo and Counsel scenario is
slightly altered so that Counsel is working in-house for NewCo
and owns equity shares or possesses stock options such that
NewCo’s impending IPO could compromise Counsel’s
independent, unbiased advice, then Counsel must decline
representation. However, inside counsel are not permitted the
luxury of simply choosing not to represent a client − indeed, by
definition they only have one client. Inside counsel’s declining
representation would entail quitting their jobs and risking
financial security for themselves and their families.
In
contrast, outside attorneys with multiple other clients can more
easily avoid a potential conflict by declining representation and
shifting their time to other clients with available work.
What ethical choice does inside counsel have with respect
to representing her only client? She has the duty to inform her
management, whenever asked to advise the company in any
matter in which inside counsel’s ability to provide independent
advice might be compromised by economic exigencies, to
explain the potential conflict, and to suggest that management
consider retaining an independent lawyer to advise the
company in the matter. Such situations might arise, for
example, when she is asked to advise on the sufficiency of
preparations and disclosures for an initial public offering, or
when she is asked to handle a subpoena issued to the company
in a government investigation, or when she is asked to advise
as to the fairness of the CEO’s compensation package.
Not only are the options available to inside counsel more
constrained, the conflict of interest as described in the NewCo
scenario can arise more subtly and with greater frequency,
even when stock options are not involved. When the CEO of
NewCo instructs Counsel to execute a business plan, Counsel

representation of a client may be impaired or limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to others, and does not depend upon the existence of an actual
adverse relationship, ‘direct’ or not.” GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., 1 THE
LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT § 1.7, at 249 (2d ed. 1998) (emphasis in original).
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feels a natural compulsion to assist the CEO in executing the
plan, even if the legality of certain steps in the plan might
otherwise trouble him. Counsel may feel a more powerful
compulsion than an outside counsel, who is not so dependent on
the personal goodwill of the CEO for his family’s immediate
sustenance. The CEO’s influence over Counsel’s status at
NewCo, and the inherent compulsion that Counsel feels to
align himself to the goals of the CEO, may be analogous to the
conflict of interest that Counsel feels when he is two weeks
away from turning his five percent equity into five million
dollars. If Counsel feels any propensity whatsoever to act
against his independent professional advice, regardless of
whether an actual conflict ever materializes, then Counsel is in
the same situation as an equity-holding attorney who is
advising his client on going public. Again, Opinion 418 is clear
on the action that must be taken: if the attorney’s self-interest
justifies a reasonable belief that his representation may not be
independent and unbiased, then under Rule 1.7(b) the attorney
20
must decline representation.
In another permutation of the Counsel and NewCo
hypothetical, NewCo’s founder and CEO (“Founder”) cashes out
his equity and begins another business venture. As an outside
attorney, Counsel handles the legal aspects of the business
transaction, in addition to drafting the noncompete agreement
that restrains Founder from developing any technology for the
next three years that would compete with NewCo. One year
after the equity buyout, Founder creates a new restaurant
chain named Cheese-E-Chuck. Because of the relationship that
Founder developed with Counsel while at NewCo, Founder
calls Counsel and asks him to assist in his new business
endeavor.
Counsel is eager to handle Founder’s work.
Founder’s innovative ideas resulted in the success at NewCo,
and Counsel believes that representing Founder in his new
business endeavor with Cheese-E-Chuck could be very
lucrative.
Before Counsel accepts Founder’s offer, Counsel must
consider whether the ethical rules permit this representation.
When Founder worked at NewCo, he was the majority
shareholder and CEO and thus spoke for the company.
Counsel took orders from Founder, and it was Founder that
instructed Counsel to prepare the buyout transaction.
20. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
418 (2000).
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Although Counsel perceived Founder as the client, his client
was actually the business entity NewCo. When Counsel
evaluates whether he can represent Founder after his
departure from NewCo, Counsel must consider whether there
are any potential conflicts between NewCo and Founder that
may adversely affect his representation of both parties. If
NewCo’s new owner forms a belief that Founder’s warranties
were not fulfilled or if some controversy arises with respect to
the conduct of the business prior to the change in ownership,
Counsel will be placed in a position of being unable to represent
21
For example, if Cheese-E-Chuck develops into a
Founder.
competitor of NewCo within the next two years, NewCo may
have a claim for breach of contract against Founder. Since
Counsel represented NewCo in the drafting of the contract, this
prior representation would make Counsel ineligible to
represent Founder.
Another conflict could arise if NewCo is sued for producing
a defective product. Counsel may have reviewed a safety
analysis while working for Founder and NewCo. Although
Counsel’s personal knowledge of Founder’s actions while at
NewCo would be an advantage to NewCo in investigating the
products liability claim, Counsel’s current representation of
22
Founder may disqualify Counsel from assisting NewCo. Thus,
Counsel must carefully consider any other potential conflicts
before Counsel accepts an offer to work for Founder, or Counsel
may be risking a future disqualification and potential
malpractice liability.
B.

COMPLIANCE WITH MODEL RULES 1.8(a) AND 1.5(a)

When Counsel, either as an inside or outside attorney,
decides to accept equity in NewCo, Counsel must satisfy certain
ethical “procedural” requirements, in addition to avoiding a
conflict of interest. Thus, a lawyer who acquires stock in a
client corporation in lieu of or in addition to a cash fee enters
into a business transaction with a client, such that the
23
requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a) must be satisfied. Under
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (2000).
22. See id.
23. Model Rule 1.8(a) reads:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client . . .
unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
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Rule 1.8(a), the transaction must be fair and reasonable; the
terms must be fully disclosed and explained to the client; the
transaction must be specified in writing; and the lawyer must
24
allow the client to seek independent counsel. The following
section discusses how to properly satisfy the “procedural”
requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a).
1.

The Lawyer Must Ensure That the Terms of the
Transaction are Fair and Reasonable

In determining whether Rule 1.8(a)’s first requirement of
fairness and reasonableness to the client is satisfied, an
attorney must consider the factors enumerated in Model Rule
25
1.5(a). Rule 1.5(a) states:
The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
26
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably
understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) (2000).
24. Id.
25. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (2000). In
addition, in evaluating whether the transaction is fair and reasonable, the
lawyer may have to consider criteria beyond just the factors in Rule 1.5(a).
For example, in determining reasonableness of a fee when accepting client
stock, the lawyer also should consider: (i) the liquidity of the stock, (ii) the
potential for it to be publicly traded, (iii) restrictions on the transferability of
the stock that may affect its value, and (iv) the stock’s expected value, in light
of any risks that a proposed patent or trademark may not be granted or
necessary government approvals may not be received. See Utah Ethics Adv.
Op. Comm., Op. 98-13, 1998 WL 863904 * 1 (Dec. 4, 1998).
26. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (2000).
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Opinion 418 explains that the Rule 1.5(a) criteria must be
evaluated in determining whether an equity transaction
27
between a lawyer and a client is fair and reasonable.
A
lawyer must properly balance these factors in bartering his
legal services for a client’s equity because in a disciplinary
hearing he will bear the burden of persuasion in demonstrating
28
Further, not
that the transaction was fair and reasonable.
only is the burden on the lawyer to demonstrate that the
transaction was fair and reasonable, but the lawyer is held to
an objective standard, i.e., it is incumbent upon the lawyer to
take account of all information reasonably ascertainable at the
29
time when the agreement for stock acquisition is made.
One of the risks in these types of transactions is that
failing to satisfy the fair and reasonable requirement may
30
result in an invalidation of the equity transfer. Opinion 418
31
provided two case citations as examples of this danger. The
first example described a scenario involving a lawyer for a
corporation to whom the board had authorized issuance of $33
million in stock of the corporation in connection with his legal
32
services. The lawyer was denied recovery of the $33 million in
stock because he had failed to advise the board of directors to
33
consult independent counsel about the transaction. The court
noted that independent counsel could have provided
information such that “the board of directors might or might
not have been so enthusiastic about [the lawyer’s offer] as to
34
give away three percent of the stock.” The second example
from the Formal Opinion involved a judicial order canceling a
contract that transferred to a lawyer an undivided one-fourth
35
interest in mineral rights in land owned by clients. The court
found that consideration for the conveyance was lacking and
27. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
418 (2000).
28. See id. (citations omitted).
29. See id. (citations omitted).
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Passanate v. McWilliams, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1240, 1242, 62 Cal.
Rptr.2d 298, 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
33. See id. at 1248, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d at 302.
34. See id. (“Bargaining between the parties might have resulted in
Passante [the lawyer] settling for just a reasonable finder’s fee. Independent
counsel would likely have at least reminded the board members of the obvious
– that a grant of stock to Passante might complicate future capital
acquisition.”).
35. See Matthews v. Spears, 24 So.2d 195, 196-97 (La. App. 1945).
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that the lawyer did not fully disclose the nature of the
36
transaction.
Both of these cases demonstrate the risks a
lawyer faces when acquiring a financial interest in a client.
2.

The Lawyer Must Ensure that the Terms Are Fully
Disclosed and Explained to the Client

Beyond satisfying requirements of fairness and
reasonableness under Rule 1.8(a), an attorney must fully
disclose the terms of the transaction in a manner that can be
37
Opinion 418 instructs
reasonably understood by the client.
that an attorney must “explain the transaction and its potential
effects on the client-lawyer relationship in a way that the client
38
can understand it.” As an example, Opinion 418 explains that
“if the acquisition of stock by the lawyer will create rights
under corporate by-laws or other agreements that will limit the
client’s control of the corporation, the lawyer should discuss
with the client the possible consequences of such an
39
arrangement.” Again, the formal opinion provided two case
citations as examples of the possible consequence of failing to
40
First, a
explain adequately a transaction to the client.
transaction between a lawyer and his client involving the sale
of the client’s land to a group of investors in which the lawyer
was a member was referred to disciplinary authority, even
though the contract between client and lawyer was sufficiently
41
fair and reasonable to decree specific performance. Second, an
attorney’s failure to make a full disclosure where he was
acquiring an interest in his client’s farm land resulted in a
court-ordered attorney reprimand “even though [the attorney]
42
did not act dishonestly or make a profit on the transaction.”
36. See id. at 198 (“While there is nothing to prevent an attorney from
dealing with his client and acquiring from him property or property rights for
a valuable consideration either in money or for services rendered or to be
rendered, yet such dealings will be closely scrutinized by the courts, and if it
appears that the attorney did not fully inform his client of all phases of the
transaction and its full meaning and import, and any disadvantages that
might result to the client, the courts will not hesitate to set aside the
transaction.”)
37. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) (2000).
38. Formal Op. 418.
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id.
41. See Ruth v. Crane, 392 F. Supp. 724, 731-32 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d, 564
F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977).
42. Comm. on Prof. Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n v.
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3. The Transaction Must Be Specified in Writing
Opinion 418 explains that full disclosure of the terms of the
transaction must go beyond a simple discussion with the client:
“Full disclosure also includes specifying in writing the scope of
the services to be performed in return for receipt of the stock or
43
the opportunity to invest.” Further, Opinion 418 states that a
test for adequate written disclosure is whether the attorney
employed the writing to make “a good faith effort to explain in
understandable language the important features of the
particular arrangement and its material consequences as far as
reasonably can be ascertained at the time of the stock
44
acquisition.” Although the ideal writing would contain all the
salient features of the lawyer-client transaction, Opinion 418
acknowledges that “compliance with Rule 1.8(a) does not
require reiteration of details that the client already knows from
45
However, the opinion does warn that “the
other sources.”
lawyer bears the risk of omitting a term that seems
unimportant at the time, but later becomes significant because
[the lawyer] has the burden of showing reasonable compliance
46
with Rule 1.8(a)(1).”
4.

The Lawyer Must Allow the Client to Seek Independent
Counsel

In addition to fully disclosing the fair and reasonable
equity transaction and codifying the agreement in writing, the
attorney must also provide the client with a “reasonable
opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the
transaction and [the client] must consent in writing to the
47
The formal opinion noted that
transaction and its terms.”
“although not required by the Model Rules, the written
documentation of the transaction should include the lawyer’s
48
recommendation to obtain such advice.”

Mershon, 316 N.W.2d 895, 899-900 (Iowa 1982).
43. Formal Op. 418 (2000).
44. Id. (citation omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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C. CONCLUSION
Although taking equity in a client is permissible under the
Model Rules, Opinion 418 and the principles outlined above
suggest that this type of transaction is fraught with ethical
pitfalls. As an example of how differently another group of
professional advisors views investments in client ventures,
certified public accountants are prohibited from investing in
49
their clients.
The American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Code of Conduct, the rules governing
certified public accountants, recognizes a per se conflict of
interest when accountants invest in clients for whom they
50
perform auditing services. The AICPA Code of Conduct states
that independence is impaired when the accountant has a
51
direct or material indirect financial interest in a client. The
AICPA Code of Conduct requires that the accountant withdraw
regardless of whether the client is willing to waive the conflict:
This strict policy highlights the gravity of the potential
conflict of interest when professional advisors are also
investors. Clearly, if the accountant has significant equity at
stake, there is an incentive to make the financial statements
appear more favorable to the accountant’s investment. The
52
AICPA ethical rules are designed to take away that incentive.
The Model Rules that guide attorneys, however, approach this
scenario differently.
Although the AICPA ethical guidelines prohibit certified
public accountants from acquiring equity in their clients, the
Model Rules permit this type of transaction under limited
circumstances. The ABA’s formal opinion advises that a great
deal of care and forethought and a close reading of the Model
Rules must be employed to properly execute a lawyer-client
equity transaction. To apply the requirements of Rules 1.7(b),
1.8(a), and 1.5(a) to the scenario of NewCo and Counsel,
Counsel should begin by using the factors in Rule 1.5(a) to
determine whether receiving the bargained-for stock in lieu of
53
Then, Counsel must
cash payments is fair and reasonable.
make a full disclosure to NewCo. Counsel must fully explain
49. See McAlpine, supra note 6, at 564-65.
50. See 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS § 101.01-02, at 4411 (1996).
51. See id.
52. See McAlpine, supra note 6, at 565.
53. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 418 (2000).
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not only the terms of the stock transfer, but also the potential
54
effects on the NewCo-Counsel relationship.
Counsel should
inform the client that events subsequent to the stock
acquisition could create a conflict of interest between Counsel’s
exercise of independent professional judgment as a lawyer and
55
the desire to protect the value of the newly-acquired stock.
Counsel also should advise the client that as a consequence of
such a conflict, he might be required to withdraw as counsel for
NewCo, or, at a minimum, recommend that another lawyer
advise NewCo on the matter regarding which Counsel has a
56
personal conflict of interest.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR INSIDE COUNSEL
Although in-house counsel have been traditionally termed
“single client” lawyers, these “single client” lawyers are
increasingly finding themselves mired in impermissible client
57
These impermissible conflicts result from a
conflicts.
simultaneous representation of multiple clients, such as the
joint representation of both a company and its constituents,
58
This joint
including officers, directors, or employees.
representation often stems from a misunderstanding with
respect to the lawyer’s interaction with individuals within the
59
company.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers provides
that an attorney-client relationship arises when “a person
manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer
provide legal services for the person” and either the lawyer
“manifests to the person consent to do so” or “the lawyer fails to
manifest lack of consent to do so, and . . . the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on
60
In a comment, the
the lawyer to provide the services.”
Restatement specifically addresses the representation of
organizational clients, such as corporations, stating that “a

54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues
Emerging from the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L.
REV. 497 (1998).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 (1998).
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lawyer’s failure to clarify whom the lawyer represents in
circumstances calling for such a result might lead a lawyer to
have entered into client-lawyer representations not intended by
61
the lawyer.” The comment continues:
Hence, the lawyer must clarify whom the lawyer intends to
represent when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that, contrary to the lawyer’s own intention, a person,
individual, or agents of the entity, on behalf of the entity,
reasonably rely on the lawyer to provide legal services to that
person or entity. . . . Such clarification may be required, for
example, with respect to an officer of an entity client such as a
corporation, with respect to one or more partners in a client
partnership, or in the case of affiliated organizations such as a
parent, subsidiary or similar organization related to that client
62
person or entity.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also provide
instruction on representation of individuals within a
corporation. Rule 1.13(d) provides that “[i]n dealing with an
organization’s directors, officers, employees, members or other
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when it is apparent that the organization’s interests are
adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
63
dealing.”
Both the Restatement and the Model Rules instruct a
lawyer to clarify to individuals in a corporation that the entity
is the client whom the lawyer represents and the individual is
64
However, there is always a danger of an inadvertent
not.
representation.
One situation that may give rise to an
inadvertent representation is an internal corporate
investigation in response to a pending criminal or regulatory
65
Corporate officers may not understand that
investigation.
inside counsel are not conducting interviews for the purpose of
defending the officers, but rather to defend the corporation
even if the corporation’s defense requires that counsel develop a
case against the officers and later divulge the information
66
Inside counsel must be
about them to the authorities.
especially sensitive to this misunderstanding if the attorney
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at cmt. f.
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(d) (2000).
See discussion supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
See Moore, supra note 57, at 502.
See id. at 502-03.
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has frequent contact with an individual within the corporation
67
or if the attorney reports to that person. It may be advisable
to proffer a “corporate ‘Miranda’ warning” that informs the
individual that his statements to corporate counsel may be
68
used against him in a court of law.
Although corporate investigations may give rise to
misunderstandings as to whom the attorney is representing,
these situations are not the only ones in which inadvertent
69
representations can exist. The line between the position of an
advising attorney and a fellow corporate employee is often
blurred for inside counsel when they participate in drafting
employment agreements and compensation plans for
management, when they provide assistance in exercising of
stock options, and when they advise on the purchase or sale of
70
Inside counsel may view these
securities and other filings.
services as simply acting on the company’s behalf; however,
failing to clarify who is the client and the nature of the
representation at the outset may lead to the formation of an
71
inadvertent attorney-client relationship with an individual.
Further blurring of the line between representing an
individual and representing the corporation can occur when
inside counsel is called on to represent individuals within the
corporation, such as directors, officers, employees, members, or
72
shareholders. As discussed above, Model Rule 1.7 controls
when an attorney faces potential or actual conflicts of interest
73
If
in representing both the corporation and an employee.
consent is permissible to cure the potential conflict, the consent
by the corporation must be given by an individual distinct from
74
the employee who is being represented. For example, a CEO
whose interests may diverge from that of the corporation is not
67. See id. at 503.
See also D.C. Bar Ethics
68. See id. (internal citation omitted).
Committee, Op. 269 (“A lawyer retained by a corporation to conduct an
internal investigation represents the corporation only, and not any of its
constituents, such as officers or employees. Corporate constituents have no
right of confidentiality as regards communications with the lawyer, but the
lawyer must advise them of his position as counsel to the corporation in the
event of any ambiguity as to his role.”)
69. See Moore, supra note 57, at 505.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See discussion supra note 19 and accompanying text.
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (2000).
74. See The Ethics of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in ETHICAL
LITIGATION § 10.3 (1997).
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permitted to consent to the representation on behalf of the
corporation.
In sum, inside counsel must be vigilant in articulating
their position as representatives for the corporate entity and
not the employee. Since officers who have daily interaction
with inside counsel may assume that counsel’s advice applies to
them personally, the duty is on the counsel to guard against
this
misunderstanding
and
avoid
any
inadvertent
representations.
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BEFORE THE PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
An attorney who practices before the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”), specializing in drafting patents
in a specific technological field, may find himself caught in a
baffling conflict of interest.
The Federal Regulations,
governing procedures before the PTO, require disclosure by the
inventor or his attorney of any information known to either of
75
them and material to the prosecution of a patent application.
Meanwhile, Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibits an attorney from revealing the confidential
76
information of his client. The PTO Code (“Code”) also requires
that an attorney preserve “the confidences and secrets of a
77
The Code defines “confidences” as “information
client.”
protected by the attorney-client or agent-client privilege under
78
Under the Code, “‘secret’ refers to other
applicable law.”
information gained in the professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
75. See 37 C.F.R. 1.56 (2000).
provision reads in pertinent part:0

The duty of candor established in this

Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the
Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information
known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in
this section . . .
(c) Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent
application within the meaning of this section are:
(1) Each inventor named in the application;
(2) Each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the
application . . . .

Id.
76. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (2000).
77. 37 C.F.R. 10.56 (2000).
78. 37 C.F.R. 10.57(a) (2000).
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would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to
79
the client.”
Unless the client consents, the attorney is not
permitted to disclose the secrets or confidences or use them to
the disadvantage of the client.
Although the duty to disclose and the requirement to keep
client confidences often dovetail, they diverge when an attorney
possesses confidential information from one client that also
happens to be material to the prosecution of a patent for
80
another client. This divergence is especially critical because a
patent prosecuted without full disclosure by the attorney may
be unenforceable. Specifically, the Federal Regulations explain
that it is “misconduct” for an attorney to “engage in conduct
81
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”
This “conduct” is defined as “knowingly giving false or
misleading information or knowingly participating in a
material way in giving false or misleading information to the
82
PTO,” as well as “knowingly violating or causing to be violated
83
the requirements of 37 C.F.R. 1.56.”
If an attorney is unable to disclose client confidences or
secrets because the client prohibits the attorney from divulging
this information, but the attorney is duty-bound to disclose the
79. See id. The PTO Code also provides that:
(a) A practitioner shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of
the practitioner’s independent professional judgment in behalf of a client
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the
proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve the practitioner
in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under
paragraph (c) of this section;
(b) A practitioner shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise
of the practitioner’s independent professional judgment in behalf of a
client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the practitioner’s
representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve the
practitioner in representing differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under paragraph (c) of this section;
(c) In the situations covered by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section a
practitioner may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that the
practitioner can adequately represent the interest of each and if each
consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect
of such representation on the exercise of the practitioner’s independent
professional judgment on behalf of each.

37 C.F.R. 10.66(a)-(c) (2000).
80. See David Hricik, The Risks and Responsibilities of Attorneys and
Firms Prosecuting Patents for Different Clients in Related Technologies, 8 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 332-34 (2000).
81. 37 C.F.R. 10.23(b)(4).
82. 37 C.F.R. 10.23(c)(2)(ii).
83. 37 C.F.R. 10.23(c)(10).
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information in order to fulfill his duty of candor to the PTO, the
84
attorney must withdraw from the representation.
An
attorney does not have the option to continue prosecuting a
patent application while failing to disclose his actual material
knowledge, even though this information may be the secret or
85
confidential information of another client.
This difficulty is particularly germane to a lawyer whose
practice is focused in particular forms of business activity, such
as the dot.com world. He will have access to the technical
information of various companies, each of which will be seeking
a technological edge against the others, through patenting or
convenience of use, or both. When one client proposes to patent
its technical solution to an internet problem, and the lawyer
has already seen a similar solution being proposed or
implemented at another dot.com enterprise, his ethical
dilemma as to each client is insoluble. Must he tell the first
client what he has seen at the second client’s facility? Must he
tell the second client of the first client’s plan to patent their
technology? Must he tell the PTO of the second client’s prior
use? How can he sit in a meeting listening to the first client’s
business strategy, while knowing about the second client’s
technology?
CONCLUSION
The rules of ethics represent an effort by lawyers, thinking
abstractly, to define what the public should be able to expect
from the counsel they retain. Those expectations may be
compromised by a lawyer’s eagerness to sign a new client or
increase his family’s standard of living. Admittedly, it is not
always easy for a lawyer to do the right thing. There is novelty
and excitement to signing a new client. The prospect of
financial prosperity is a powerful motivator.
However,
situations arise in which a lawyer must carefully evaluate a
prospective advantage against his own ability to provide
forthright advice. The rules of ethics help guide a lawyer in
periods of weakness, insuring that obligations to existing
clients are not overcome and that a lawyer will remain
independent in providing a professional opinion. Although the
dot.com phenomenon has presented its own ethical pitfalls, the

84. See Hricik, supra note 80, at 344.
85. See id.
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rules of ethics should serve the same role in this culture as in
the more traditional settings, in guiding attorneys away from
situations in which professional independence may be
compromised.

APPENDIX
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Formal Opinion 00-418
Acquiring Ownership in
*
Performing Legal Services

a

Client

in

Connection

with

July 7, 2000
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit a
lawyer from acquiring an ownership interest in a client, either
in lieu of a cash fee for providing legal services or as an
investment opportunity in connection with such services, as long
as the lawyer complies with Rule 1.8(a) governing business
transactions with clients, and, when applicable, with Rule 1.5
requiring that a fee for legal services be reasonable. To comply
with Rule 1.8(a), the transaction by which the lawyer acquires
the interest and its terms must be fair and reasonable to the
client, and fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a
manner that can be reasonably understood by the client. The
client also must be given a reasonable opportunity to seek the
advice of independent counsel in the transaction and must
consent to the transaction in writing. In providing legal services
to the client’s business while owning its stock, the lawyer must
take care to avoid conflicts between the client’s interests and the
lawyer’s personal economic interests as an owner, as required by
Rule 1.7(b), and must exercise independent professional
judgment in advising the client concerning legal matters as
required by Rule 2.1.

*

Reprinted by permission of the American Bar Association. © 2000, The
American Bar Association.
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BACKGROUND
With growing frequency, lawyers who provide legal
services to start-up businesses are investing in their clients,
sometimes accepting an ownership interest as a part or all of
1
the fee.
Some representatives of the organized bar have
2
questioned this practice. Many lawyers nevertheless believe
that acquiring ownership interests in start-up business clients
is desirable in order to satisfy client needs and also, because of
growing competition with higher paying venture capital and
investment firms, to attract and retain partners and
3
From the client’s perspective, the lawyer’s
associates.
willingness to invest with entrepreneurs in a start-up company
frequently is viewed as a vote of confidence in the enterprise’s
prospects. Moreover, a lawyer’s willingness to accept stock
instead of a cash fee may be the only way for a cash-poor client
to obtain competent legal advice. Frequently, this may be the
4
determining factor in the client’s selection of a lawyer.
The Committee in this Opinion examines the issues that
1. See, e.g., Jason M. Klein, No Fool for a Client: The Finance and
Incentives Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate Lawyers, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329, 330-31; Debra Baker, Who Wants to be a
Millionaire?, 86 A.B.A. JOURNAL, February 2000, at 36, 37. Although the
interest the lawyer acquires usually is in the form of stock or warrants or
options to buy stock of a corporation, this Opinion applies equally to ownership
in any form of business entity, such as a limited liability company, limited
partnership, or business trust that is the client of the lawyer. For convenience,
this Opinion assumes the ownership interest is comprised of corporate stock.
2. See, e.g., ABA Commission on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public
Service: A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986), in
which the Commission identified lawyers investing in the activities of clients
as one of several problem areas. The Commission expressed the view that
lawyers investing in clients “may make the client’s financing efforts easier,
[but that] it creates a potential or actual conflict of interest, changing the
lawyer-client relationship in a very fundamental way.” Id. at 31 (footnotes
omitted). See also ABA Section of Litigation Task Force on the Independent
Lawyer, Taking an Interest in the Client’s Business in Lieu of a Fee (Draft
August 1999); Baker, supra note 1, at 39-40.
3. See, e.g., Sean Somerville, Lawyers Stocking Up on Payday,
BALTIMORE SUN, November 7, 1999, at D-1. See also Shawn Neidorf, Silicon
Valley Lawyers Embrace VC-Like Role, VENTURE CAPITAL J., Oct. 1, 1999, at
1, 2 (“Most Silicon Valley attorneys defer billing, with many offering discounts
for the opportunity to invest in a client’s company through a law firm’s fund.”).
4. Klein, supra note 1, at 351, also argues that compensating lawyers
with equity interests finds support in public policy. Similar to contingent fees,
permitting clients to pay with stock or options creates a financing device that
allows clients broader access to legal services by providing an alternative
currency to pay for those services.
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must be addressed under the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct when a lawyer or law firm acquires an ownership
interest in a client in connection with performing legal
5
services. A typical situation might be one in which the client
business is a corporation that the law firm is organizing at the
request of the founding entrepreneurs. The latter already have
a few friends and family members who are eager to invest
funds to start up the corporation. The founders may allow the
lawyer working with them to invest the firm’s fee for legal
services in stock of the corporation. The organizers expect the
law firm to introduce them to the firm’s venture capital
contacts and to continue representing the corporation,
6
eventually performing the services necessary to take it public.
A.

COMPLIANCE WITH RULES 1.8(a) AND 1.5(a) WHEN
ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP IN A CLIENT

In our opinion, a lawyer who acquires stock in her client
corporation in lieu of or in addition to a cash fee for her services
enters into a business transaction with a client, such that the
7
In
requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a) must be satisfied.
5. The Committee notes that a lawyer considering the acquisition of
ownership in a client should address practical issues as well as legal issues
that arise under law other than the Model Rules when a lawyer owns an
interest in a client. Among these issues are: (1) extent of coverage under
lawyer professional responsibility policies when the lawyer also is a
stockholder; (2) possibility of civil liability claims, including stockholder
derivative actions resulting from the lawyer representing the client in certain
types of matters; (3) desirability of adopting clear policies on investing in
clients in order to minimize liability risks and to avoid internal disharmony
among lawyers in the firm regarding investment opportunities individual
lawyers may be offered by clients; and (4) need for assuring compliance by all
firm personnel with securities law and regulations.
6. We see no substantial difference under the Model Rules between
direct payment to the lawyer of her fee by way of an interest in the business
entity in lieu of cash and the opportunity to purchase an interest for cash, if
the opportunity to acquire the stock would not have been offered had the
lawyer not also undertaken to perform legal services. The same ethical issues
also must be addressed whether the ownership interest is acquired directly by
the lawyer or by an investment partnership controlled by the lawyer or
members of her firm.
7. Rule 1.8(a) states in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client . . .
unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably
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determining whether Rule 1.8(a)’s first requirement of fairness
and reasonableness to the client is satisfied, the general
standard of Rule 1.5(a) that “[a] lawyer’s fee shall be
reasonable” and the factors enumerated under that Rule are
8
relevant.
For purposes of judging the fairness and reasonableness of
the transaction and its terms, the Committee’s opinion is that,
as when assessing the reasonableness of a contingent fee, only
the circumstances reasonably ascertainable at the time of the
9
transaction should be considered. It seems clear that “in a

understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.

Authorities are in agreement that Rule 1.8(a) applies when a lawyer accepts
an interest in the client in connection with a fee for legal services. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Proposed Official
Draft 1998) § 126 cmt. a (requirements of § 126 apply when lawyer takes
interest in client’s business as fee); see also G.C. HAZARD AND W.W. HODES,
THE LAW OF LAWYERING (2d ed. 1998) § 1.8:202 et seq.; C. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS (1986) § 8.11.2 (Model Rule 1.8(a) or former Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 5-104(A) apply to the transaction). Rule 1.8(a)
does not, however, apply when the lawyer acquires the stock in an open
market purchase or in other circumstances not involving direct intervention
by the client.
8. Rule 1.5(a) states that:
The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Rule 1.5 would not apply if the opportunity to invest was not offered in
connection with undertaking to provide legal services.
9. See supra note 7, RESTATEMENT § 207 Cmt. e (“Fairness is determined
based on facts that reasonably could be known at the time of the transaction,
not as facts later develop.”). See also ABA Formal Op. 94-389 (1994)
(Contingent Fees), note 21 (finding various aspects of contingent fee
arrangements to be ethical. The note cites Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees
Without Contingencies, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 87 (1989), to the effect that the
legitimacy of a contingency fee is to be judged by the effort expected “prior to
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discipline case, once proof has been introduced that the lawyer
entered into a business transaction with a client, the burden of
persuasion is on the lawyer to show that the transaction was
fair and reasonable and that the client was adequately
10
Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the lawyer to
informed.”
take account of all information reasonably ascertainable at the
11
time when the agreement for stock acquisition is made.
Determining that the fee is reasonable in terms of the
enumerated factors under Rule 1.5(a) does not resolve whether
the requirement of Rule 1.8(a) that the transaction and terms
be “fair and reasonable to the client” has been met.
Determining “reasonableness” under both rules also involves
making the often difficult determination of the market value of
the stock at the time of the transaction. As Professors Hazard
and Hodes state, “one danger [to the lawyer who accepts stock
as a fee] is that the business will so prosper that the fee will
12
Of course, instead of
later appear unreasonably high.”
increasing in value, the stock may become worthless, as occurs
13
frequently with start-up enterprises. The risk of failure and
the commencement of representation,” not by the actual effort expended.)
(Emphasis supplied); Klein, supra note 1, at 336 (“Review of the fee is only
appropriate at the time the fee is granted, for the lawyer has undertaken
100% of the risk associated with the value of that fee in the future.”).
10. See supra note 7, RESTATEMENT § 207 at 639; see also Cmt. e at 64142. The transaction also remains voidable in a civil suit, and the lawyer
investor, as a fiduciary, has the burden of proving its fairness. See
RESTATEMENT § 207 cmt. a; see also Passanate v. McWilliams, 53 Cal. App.
4th 1240, 1248, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 298, 302 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (lawyer for
corporation denied recovery of $32 million for stock of corporation that its
board previously had authorized to be issued him in connection with his legal
services because the lawyer failed to advise board to consult independent
counsel about the transaction); Matthews v. Spears, 24 So. 2d 195 (La. App.
1945) (court cancelled contract transferring to lawyer undivided one-fourth
interest in mineral rights in land owned by clients on the grounds that the
lawyer did not fully disclose the nature of the transaction and because
consideration for the conveyance was lacking).
11. See also Comment [2] to Rule 1.5(a) stating that a fee paid in property
(such as corporate stock) “may be subject to special scrutiny because it
involves questions concerning both the value of the services and the lawyer’s
special knowledge of the value of the property.” Though the Comment is
applicable here, meeting the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) serves to satisfy the
special scrutiny standard applicable to the receipt of property in exchange for
services.
12. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.8:202 at 264.
13. In comparing cash to stock compensation, Klein points out that “when
a lawyer is compensated with stock or options rather than with cash, the
lawyer accepts the risk or uncertainty in the value of the stock or options. . . .
The risk in the future value of the stock or options is significant, because there
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the stock’s nonmarketability are important factors that the
lawyer must consider, along with all other information bearing
on value that is reasonably ascertainable at the time when the
14
agreement is made.
One way for the lawyer to minimize the risk noted by
Professors Hazard and Hodes is to establish a reasonable fee
for her services based on the factors enumerated under Rule
15
1.5(a) and then accept stock that at the time of the transaction
is worth the reasonable fee. Of course, the stock should, if
feasible, be valued at the amount per share that cash investors,
knowledgeable about its value, have agreed to pay for their
stock about the same time.
A reasonable fee also may include an agreed percentage of
the stock issued or to be issued when the value of the shares is
not reasonably ascertainable. For example, if the lawyer is
engaged by two founders who are contributing intellectual
property for their stock, it may not be possible to establish with
reasonable certainty the cash value of their contribution. If so,
it also would not be possible to establish with reasonable
certainty the value of the shares to be issued to the lawyer
retained to perform initial services for the corporation. In such
cases, the percentage of stock agreed upon should reflect the
value, as perceived by the client and the lawyer at the time of
the transaction, that the legal services will contribute to the
potential success of the enterprise. The value of the stock
received by the lawyer will, like a contingent fee permitted
under Rule 1.5(c), depend upon the success of the
16
undertaking.
In addition to assuring that the stock transaction and its
is no downside protection.” Supra note 1, at 339-40.
14. See Utah Ethics Adv. Op. Comm Op. 98-13, 1998 WL 863904 * 1 (Dec.
4, 1998) (in addition to factors enumerated under Rule 1.5(a), the lawyer also
should consider in determining reasonableness of a fee when accepting client
stock: (i) the liquidity of the stock, (ii) whether and when it can be expected to
be publicly traded, (iii) any restrictions on its transfer, and (iv) its presently
anticipated value, including the risks that a proposed patent or trademark
may not be granted or necessary government approvals may not be received).
15. Supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. The Committee is aware that sometimes the lawyer will ask the
corporation to issue her a percentage of the shares initially issued to the
founders as a condition to the lawyer agreeing to become counsel to the new
enterprise. We take no position on the ethical propriety of this practice. We
caution, however, that in this circumstance, and especially if the cash value of
the shares is not reasonably ascertainable, the lawyer should take special care
to be in a position to justify the reasonableness of the total fee should it later
be questioned as a violation of Rule 1.5(a).
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terms are fair and reasonable to the client, compliance with
Rule 1.8(a) also requires that the transaction and its terms
must be fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner
17
that can be reasonably understood by the client. Thus, the
lawyer must be careful not only to set forth the terms in
writing, but also to explain the transaction and its potential
effects on the client-lawyer relationship in a way that the client
can understand it. For example, if the acquisition of stock by
the lawyer will create rights under corporate by-laws or other
agreements that will limit the client’s control of the
corporation, the lawyer should discuss with the client the
18
possible consequences of such an arrangement.
At the outset, the lawyer also should inform the client that
events following the stock acquisition could create a conflict
between the lawyer’s exercise of her independent professional
judgment as a lawyer on behalf of the corporation and her
19
desire to protect the value of her stock. She also should advise
the client that as a consequence of such a conflict, she might
feel constrained to withdraw as counsel for the corporation, or

17. As Professor Wolfram notes, “the fact that a transaction is arguably
fair and reasonable does not mean that MR 1.8(a) has been complied with if
the other requirements of the rule are not satisfied.” WOLFRAM, supra note 7,
§ 8.11.4 at 480 (even though contract between client and lawyer was
sufficiently fair and reasonable to decree specific performance, lawyer’s failure
to make full disclosure of the transaction to client referred to disciplinary
authority) (citing Ruth v. Crane, 392 F. Supp. 724, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d,
564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977)); Comm. on Prof. Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State
Bar Ass’n v. Mershon, 316 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Iowa 1982) (violation of DR 5104(A) established “even though respondent did not act dishonestly or make a
profit on the transaction”).
18. If the lawyer is acquiring a percentage of the equity or a class of
securities that entitles her to exercise rights not shared by stockholders
generally, then specific disclosure might be required. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof.
Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n v. Humphreys, 524 N.W.2d 396,
399 (Iowa 1994) (lawyer disbarred when, inter alia, without advising clientmajority stockholder of the potential conflict of interest, he acquired stock and
prepared corporate documents that prevented the lawyer’s termination as a
director and required the lawyer’s approval to reduce his compensation as an
officer or to take certain other corporate actions). As to the absolute right of a
client to discharge the lawyer and the conflict created by differences over
business decisions, see infra notes 33 and 34 and accompanying text.
19. Rule 2.1 admonishes: “In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise
independent judgment and render candid advice.” See also Comment [6]
under Rule 1.7 (“lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have an
adverse effect on representation of a client”); HAZARD & HODES supra note 7, §
1.8:202 at 264 (“Another danger is that the business will falter, and that [the
lawyer], worried about recovering her fee [stock rather than cash] for work
already performed, will not be able to advise the client dispassionately.”).
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at least to recommend that another lawyer advise the client on
the matter regarding which she has a personal conflict of
20
interest.
Full disclosure also includes specifying in writing the scope
of the services to be performed in return for receipt of the stock
or the opportunity to invest. The scope of services should be
covered in the written transmission to the client even though
the stock is acquired by the firm’s investment partnership as
an opportunity rather than by the firm directly as a part of the
fee in lieu of cash. If the client’s understanding is that the
lawyer keeps the stock interest regardless of the amount of
legal services performed by the lawyer and solely to assure the
lawyer’s availability, it is important to set forth this aspect of
21
Otherwise, a court might
the transaction in clear terms.
regard the stock acquisition as being in the nature of an
advance fee for services and require part of the stock to be
returned if all the work originally contemplated as part of the
services for which the stock was given has not been
22
performed.
Although it is better practice to set forth all the salient
features of the transaction in a written document, compliance
with Rule 1.8(a) does not require reiteration of details that the
client already knows from other sources. Indeed, too much
detail may tend to distract attention from the material terms.
Nonetheless, the lawyer bears the risk of omitting a term that
20. See infra note 31 and accompanying text regarding actions the lawyer
must take should a conflict later arise.
21. See Pennsylvania Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof. Resp.
Formal Op. 95-100, 1995 WL 902545 *3 (August 1, 1995) (non-refundable
retainers permissible so long as confirmed by “clear and unambiguous
language of a written statement provided to the client or a written agreement
between the attorney and client”).
22. Even though in such a case a court might not order disgorgement of
the fee in a civil action if the client ends the relationship without cause, see,
e.g., Ryan v. Butera et al., 193 F.3d 210, 218 (3rd Cir. 1999), the lawyer’s
ethics might be questioned for failure to return the “unearned” portion of the
stock acquired by the lawyer. See also Oregon State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Gov.
Formal Op. 1998-151, 1998 WL 717731 *2 (July 1998) (lawyer must return pro
rata portion of fixed fee, even though specified as “earned on receipt,” if
representation ends before lawyer performs all the work); District of Columbia
Bar Op. 264 (1996) (“special retainers or fee advances in this jurisdiction must
be refundable,” at least where “tied directly to provision of legal services,
rather than designed solely to ensure availability”); In re Cooperman, 83
N.Y.2d 465, 475, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1073, 611 N.Y.S.2d 465, 469 (N.Y. 1994)
(“non-refundable retainer fee agreement clashes with public policy because it
inappropriately compromises the right to sever the fiduciary services
relationship with the lawyer”).
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seems unimportant at the time, but later becomes significant
because she has the burden of showing reasonable compliance
with Rule 1.8(a)(1). A good faith effort to explain in
understandable language the important features of the
particular arrangement and its material consequences as far as
reasonably can be ascertained at the time of the stock
acquisition should satisfy the full disclosure requirements of
23
Rule 1.8(a).
The client also must have a reasonable opportunity to seek
the advice of independent counsel in the transaction and must
consent in writing to the transaction and its terms. In
addition, although not required by the Model Rules, the written
documentation of the transaction should include the lawyer’s
recommendation to obtain such advice.
This serves to
emphasize the importance to the client of obtaining
independent advice. The client’s failure to do so then is his own
deliberate choice. The lawyer has complied with Rule 1.8(a) in
24
this respect because actual consultation is not required.
The best way to comply with the requirements of Rule
1.8(a) is to set forth the salient terms of the transaction in a
document written in language that the client can understand
and, after the client has had an opportunity to consult with
independent counsel, to have the document signed by both
client and lawyer.
B.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE LAWYER’S INTERESTS AND THOSE
OF THE CLIENT

On rare occasions the acquisition of stock in a client
corporation will amount to acquiring, in the language of Rule

23. Professor Wolfram describes the elements constituting full disclosure
applicable generally to business dealings with clients as follows:
(1) the nature of the transaction and each of its terms; (2) the nature and
extent of the lawyer’s interest in the transaction; (3) the ways in which
the lawyer’s participation in the transaction might affect the lawyer’s
exercise of professional judgment in concurrent legal work for the client,
if any; (4) the desirability of the client’s seeking independent legal advice
if the client is not already independently represented; and (5) the nature
of the respective risks and advantages to each of the parties to the
transaction.

WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 8.11.4 at 485 (footnotes omitted).
24. When a client declines to obtain the advice of independent counsel or
chooses to seek financial advice instead, the lawyer also may wish to confirm
this in writing.
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1.8(j), “a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject
25
matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting.” As Comment
[7] under Rule 1.8 explains, the prohibition “has its basis in
common law champerty and maintenance [and] is subject to
specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in
these Rules, such as the exception for reasonable contingent
fees set forth in Rule 1.5 . . . .” The modern rationale for the
rule is the concern that a lawyer acquiring less than all of a
client’s cause of action creates so severe a conflict between the
lawyer’s interest and the client’s interest that it is
26
nonconsentable.
In our view, when the corporation has as its only
substantial asset a claim or property right (such as a license),
title to which is contested in a pending or impending lawsuit in
which the lawyer represents the corporation, Rule 1.8(j) might
be applicable to the acquisition of the corporation’s stock in
connection with the provision of legal services.
If the
acquisition of the stock constitutes a reasonable contingent fee,
however, Rule 1.8(j) would not prohibit acquisition of the
27
stock.
25. Rule 1.8(j) states:
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except
that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses;
and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

26. Professor Wolfram, in condemning Rule 1.8(j) as unnecessary,
nevertheless notes: “[a] purchase of a partial interest, of course, does present
the possibility that the lawyer will not seek and accept client guidance on
major decisions in the lawsuit because of the lawyer’s own economic interest in
the outcome.” WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 8.13 at 492. The Committee believes
that the failure to consult with the client and accept the client’s decision as
posited by Professor Wolfram would violate Rule 1.2(a) and Rule 1.7(b),
discussed in the next part of this Opinion. As Professor Wolfram suggests, no
flat prohibition against a lawyer’s purchase of an interest in a client’s cause of
action is needed “so long as the client consents and the transaction is fair and
reasonable.” Id. Of course, because this constitutes a business transaction
with a client, the lawyer also must fully comply with all the other
requirements of Rule 1.8(a) as discussed earlier in this Opinion.
27. See District of Columbia Bar Op. 179 (1987) (under DR 5-103(A),
though acquiring stock in a corporation the lawyer represented in an FCC
license application amounted to acquiring an interest in the client’s license
proceeding, no disciplinary rule is violated by the lawyer in “accepting a
reasonable contingent fee that takes the form of a small and noncontrolling
equity interest in the client”). The District of Columbia’s Rules of Professional
Conduct, later adopted, do not contain Rule 1.8(j) or any other specific
prohibition against acquiring an interest in litigation. Of course, Rule 1.8(j)
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Rule 1.7(b) prohibits representation of a client if the
representation “may be materially limited . . . by the lawyer’s
own interests,” unless two requirements are met. The lawyer
must reasonably believe that “the representation will not be
adversely affected,” and the client must consent to the
28
representation after consultation.
A lawyer’s representation of a corporation in which she
owns stock creates no inherent conflict of interest under Rule
1.7. Indeed, management’s role primarily is to enhance the
business’s value for the stockholders. Thus, the lawyer’s legal
services in assisting management usually will be consistent
with the lawyer’s stock ownership. In some circumstances, such
as the merger of one corporation in which the lawyer owns
stock into a larger entity, the lawyer’s economic incentive to
29
complete the transaction may even be enhanced.
There may, however, be other circumstances in which the
lawyer’s ownership of stock in her corporate client conflicts
with her responsibilities as the corporation’s lawyer. For
example, the lawyer might have a duty when rendering an
opinion on behalf of the corporation in a venture capital
transaction to call upon corporate management to reveal
material adverse financial information that is being withheld,
even though the revelation might cause the venture capital

also would apply were the stock itself subject to a claim in which the lawyer
represents the corporation or other stockholders. See Kansas Bar Assn. Op.
98-06 (Sept. 15, 1998) (contracts regarding corporate stock that is the subject
of litigation are not per se unethical, depending on the circumstances in the
case).
28. Rule 1.7(b) states:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests,
unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected: and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved.

29. See Klein, supra note 1, at 355-56 suggesting stock ownership as an
incentive that is in furtherance of the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to her
corporate client. Ownership of corporate client stock should not create a
conflict with the corporate client’s interests because the lawyer’s duty of
loyalty is to the corporation. Rule 1.13(a) states: “A lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its
duly authorized representatives.”
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30

investor to withdraw. In that circumstance, the lawyer must
evaluate her ability to maintain the requisite professional
independence as a lawyer in the corporate client’s best interest
by subordinating any economic incentive arising from her stock
ownership. The lawyer also must consider whether her stock
ownership might create questions concerning the objectivity of
her opinion. She must consult with her client and obtain
consent if the representation may be materially limited by her
stock ownership.
The conflict could be more severe. For example, the stock
of the client might be the lawyer’s major asset so that the
failure of the venture capital opportunity could create a serious
financial loss to her. The lawyer’s self-interest in such a case
probably justifies a reasonable belief that her representation of
the corporation would be affected adversely. This would
disqualify her under Rule 1.7(b) from providing the opinion
31
even were the client to consent.

30. Rule 2.3 applies to legal evaluations made for the use of others and
states:
(a) A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client
for the use of someone other than the client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is
compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the
client; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
(b) Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an
evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6.

As Comment [4] cautions: “The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of
professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other
functions undertaken in behalf of the client.” When making an evaluation
under Rule 2.3, the lawyer should establish with the client in the beginning
the types of information that will be revealed and any information that must
be withheld. See Comment [5] (“The quality of an evaluation depends on the
freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based.”).
31. See Rule 1.7, Comment [4] (“Loyalty to a client is . . . impaired when a
lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of
action for the client because of the lawyer’s other . . . interests. The conflict in
effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client.”).
See also Utah Ethics Adv. Op. Comm Op. 98-13, supra note 14 (quoting
Comment [4]). A lawyer who owns stock in a client corporation may, in
circumstances where her disagreement with some transaction approved by the
corporation’s board limits her ability to provide independent professional
advice to management, call upon another firm lawyer who is not so limited to
advise the client respecting the transaction. In such a circumstance, the
lawyer-stockholder must obtain consent of the client pursuant to Rule 1.7(b) to
avoid imputed disqualification of other lawyers in the firm under Rule 1.10(a).
When the probity of the lawyer’s own conduct is questioned, however, better
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In order to minimize conflicts with the interests of the
clients such as those described, some law firms have adopted
policies governing investments in clients. These policies may
include limiting the investment to an insubstantial percentage
of stock and the amount invested in any single client to a
nonmaterial sum. The policies also may require that decisions
regarding a firm lawyer’s potential client conflict be made by
someone other than the lawyer with the principal client contact
(who also may have a larger stock interest in the corporate
client) and may also transfer billing or supervisory
responsibility to a partner with no stock ownership in the
32
client.
Even though a lawyer owns stock in a corporation, she, of
course, has no right to continue to represent it as a lawyer if
33
Were the lawyer to
the corporate client discharges her.
challenge the decision duly made by the authorized corporate
constituents to discharge her, she would violate Rule 1.7(b)
because it is clear that her own interests adversely affect the

practice calls for independent counsel to advise the client. See Comment [6]
under Rule 1.7 (“The lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have
an adverse effect on representation of a client.”). See also ABA Formal Op. 98410 (1998) (Lawyer Serving as Director of Client Corporation) at 9-10; Peter
Geraghty, ASK ETHICSearch, in THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 21 (Fall 1999)
(citing other examples of conflicts between a lawyer’s interest as owner of
client property and the interests of the client).
32. Other law firm policies regarding investments in clients also include
some of the following: (1) No lawyer may invest in or with any firm client
without prior executive committee approval, sometimes excepting purchases
in de minimis amounts in a private placement or open market purchase; and
(2) Investments in nonpublic clients offered firm lawyers are to be allotted
among partners (or all firm lawyers) as investment opportunities, or may be
placed in a pooled investment fund or allocated to a bonus plan. Reminders to
avoid securities violations, including Section 10-b-5 (anti-fraud) and Section 16
(short swing profits), and mechanisms to avoid insider trading also are
frequently included.
33. Rule 1.16(a)(3) states in pertinent part that “a lawyer shall not
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw
from the representation of a client if . . . the lawyer is discharged.” See also
Comment [4]. The decision to discharge the lawyer is made by the corporation
“acting through its duly authorized constituents,” usually its chief executive or
more likely the Board of Directors in this circumstance. See Rule 1.13(a),
supra note 29. Sometimes authority to discharge counsel is vested in the
stockholders giving rise to the question whether a lawyer who is a stockholder
may ethically vote as a stockholder to retain her firm. Once the decision is
duly made, however, the client’s right to discharge a lawyer is absolute.
Whether because of contract the lawyer may recover damages for her
discharge is a matter of law beyond the scope of an ethics opinion.
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34

CONCLUSION
When a lawyer accepts stock or options to acquire stock in
a client corporation in connection with providing legal services
to it, she must comply with the requirements of Rule 1.8(a)
because the stock acquisition constitutes a business transaction
with a client and if applicable, with the requirement of Rule
1.5(a) that the lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. Under Rule
1.8(a), the stock transaction and its terms must be fair and
reasonable to the client. This is satisfied if the fee, including
receipt of the stock, is reasonable applying the enumerated
factors under Rule 1.5(a), and if the transaction and its terms
in other respects are fair and reasonable to the client under the
circumstances that are reasonably ascertainable at the time the
arrangement is made.
The terms of the transaction also must be fully disclosed in
writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably
understood by the client. Full disclosure includes, for example,
discussions of the consequences of any rights by virtue of the
lawyer’s stock ownership that may limit the client’s control of
the corporation under special corporate by-laws or other
agreements and the possibility that the lawyer’s economic
interests as a stockholder could create a conflict with the
client’s interest that might necessitate the lawyer’s withdrawal
from representation in a matter. The client also must be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult independent
counsel concerning the transaction and its terms. Finally, the
client’s consent must be in writing.
Although a lawyer’s representation of a corporation in
which the lawyer owns stock creates no inherent conflict of
interest, circumstances may arise that create a conflict between
the corporation’s interests and the lawyer’s economic interest
34. See, e.g., Comm. on Prof. Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass’n,
524 N.W.2d at 398. A lawyer who no longer represents a client whose stock
she owns must remember that a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(b) may
arise if another client seeks representation on a matter adverse to the former
client. The law firm in seeking the new client’s consent may need to disclose
not only the earlier client-lawyer relationship, but also the investment
relationship if it is material. Of course, if the stock value is so high or subject
to such risk from the second client’s matter that it would not be reasonable to
conclude that the representation would not be affected adversely, the lawyer
must decline the representation.
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as a stockholder. In such event, the lawyer must consult with
the client and obtain client consent if, as a result of her
ownership interest, the representation of the corporation in a
particular matter may be materially limited. The lawyer may
in some circumstances be required under Rule 1.7(b) to
withdraw from representing the client in a matter if her
financial interest in the client is such that she cannot
reasonably conclude that the representation would not be
adversely affected.

